

A Discourse Analysis of Major Players in Regions with Oil Conflict: The Case of
the Niger Delta

by

Claudia Espinel

Capstone Submitted in Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science
Public Relations and Corporate Communication

New York University

May 2014

Abstract

Players of conflicts in oil regions use a discourse that perpetuates violence. In order to change the violent interactions between them and build sustainable peace in these regions, communication practitioners need to understand this discourse. By using the Niger Delta conflict as case study, this capstone analyzes the written documents of oil companies, the government, and the community involved in the conflict. Even though violence in this region has its roots in ethnic issues, the arrival of the oil industry enhanced the existing violence. Political, economic, environmental, and social factors have created an environment in which there is friction between the oil companies, the government, and the community. They have built a relationship characterized by lack of trust, respect, and tolerance. Communication practitioners can help build sustainable peace in the Niger Delta by creating initiatives to change the dynamic of the relation of players of the Niger Delta conflict. Although it is difficult to create a common communication strategy for different cultures, regions dealing with oil conflicts share characteristics that make this capstone useful for similar conflicts across the world.

Table of Content

Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Conflict in the Niger Delta	2
The Niger Delta Story	2
The Nature of the Conflict	9
Players in the Conflict	14
Chapter 2: Conflict, Oil, and Communication	24
Intractable Intra-State Conflict	24
Intractable Conflicts in Oil Regions	27
Using Communication to Transform Intractable Conflicts	29
Successful Experiences Changing Discourses	30
Chapter 3: Discourse Analysis	34
The Context	34
The Issue	37
The Relationship	41
The Process	48
The Outcomes	50
Chapter 4: Recommendations	52
Chapter 5: Conclusion	60
References	63

Introduction

When the oil industry drilled the first oil well in 1958 in the Niger Delta, Nigeria became one of the strongest economies in Africa while the Niger Delta kept being one of the poorest regions in the country. Even though the underdeveloped situation of this oil region has its roots in an ethnic conflict that started before Nigeria's independence from England in 1960, the arrival of the oil industry increased violence, strengthened old rivalries, and worsened the already fragile economic, environmental, and social situation of the Niger Delta.

This capstone aims to understand the discourse used by the players of oil conflicts by analyzing the situation in the Niger Delta, in order to guide social projects looking to build peace in regions dealing with oil conflicts. Even though it can be difficult to design strategies that are effective across different cultures, oil conflicts share characteristics that make this study applicable not only to the Niger Delta but useful in similar conflicts around the world.

The first chapter of this capstone is an overview of the conflict in the Niger Delta, including the nature of the situation as well as the players involved. The second chapter explains intractable conflicts, oil conflicts, and how communications can be used to transform them. The third chapter consists of an analysis on the discourse of the players of the conflict based on press releases, news publication and reports regarding the situation in the Niger Delta. Based on this analysis, in the fourth chapter there are recommendations for peace projects in oil regions.

Chapter 1: Conflict in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta

Nigeria was a British colony from 1914 to 1960. During this time the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba people, the largest ethnic groups in the country, influenced the economic and political life of Nigeria. Minority groups were underrepresented and their pledges for more attention from national leaders were left without answer. This dynamic continued even after independence (Ibaba, Ukaga & Ukiwo, 2012).

The Niger Delta is located in the south-south region of Nigeria. It is home of several minority groups, including the Ogoni and Ijaw communities that have been central players in the region's conflict (Ibaba, Ukaga & Ukiwo, 2012). In 1956, Shell Petroleum Company drilled the first commercial productive oil well in the Niger Delta, which made the region, as well as the country, switch from an economy based on cash crop and minerals to a petroleum-based economy. By 1979, "95% of Nigerian's foreign exchange earnings and about 85% of Federal revenue" (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011, p. 45) were attached to the oil extracted in the Niger Delta.



Map of Nigeria and the Niger Delta. (Idemudia, E. Ite, 2006)

However, while Nigeria was becoming one of the most important players on global energy, the Niger Delta was still one of the poorest regions in the country. This paradox worsened the already fragile relationship between majority and minority groups in the country and motivated two attempts of secession. The first, in 1966, was led by Ijaw youth. The second, in 1970, known as the Biafra war, was led by the Igbo group. Both had the goal to get full control of the region and the oil. These rebellions did not stop the military government from claiming ownership of the country's natural resources under the Decree No 51/ Petroleum Act of 1969. It gave birth to the partnership between the state and the oil industry and left the Niger Delta community marginalized from the benefits of the oil extracted from their territory. This message of exclusion was reinforced

by the decrease of the share of the oil revenue. From 1966 to 1990, the percentage received by the local states went from 50% to 3% (Obi & Aas Rustad 2011).

In 1990, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) proposed the Ogoni Bill of Rights demanding “among other things, local autonomy, Ogoni right to control Ogoni resources (oil), and compensation for the exploitation of oil and oil pollution.” (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011, p.7). The government was silent to the pledge. Therefore, local activists started an international campaign against Shell. Peaceful protest as well as the support of international organizations brought global attention to the human rights violation against the Ogoni people and the environmental situation in the region. By the end of the campaign, Shell closed operations in Ogoniland, which brought important economic loss for the government (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011). The military government of the time decided to respond to the Ogoni’s campaign against Shell by imposing a state of terror. Leaders of MOSOP were chased, prosecuted, and killed. Members of the community who tried to speak up were threatened (Omadjohwoefe, 2011).

The violent response from the government motivated the birth of militant groups, which were led mainly by young members of the ethnic minorities. Since 1990, they have kidnapped oil companies’ employees and attacked the oil infrastructure. The government and the oil companies joined forces to inundate the Niger Delta with military forces who killed militants as well as civilians, raped women, and tortured community leaders (Omadjohwoefe, 2011).

In 1998, young people from the Ijaw community gathered to write the Kaiama Declaration (KD). Their attempt to achieve self-determination and ownership of the region was drastic:

“The Ijaw ‘cease to recognize all undemocratic laws that rob our people/community of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and Petroleum Act’ On the basis of the KD, the IYC [Ijaw Youth Council] issued an ultimatum to all oil companies to leave the Niger Delta by 30 December 1998” (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011, P. 19)

As a response, the military government declared a state of emergency in the Niger Delta. It sent troops to the region, killed protesters, and violently dissolved any kind of rebellion. As before, there were no efforts to address the social inequality at the root of the declaration (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011).

The Niger Delta people saw a possibility to change their situation in 1999 when Nigeria became a democratic nation and held its first elections. They believed the new political system would promote the development of the region, regulate the oil industry, abolish corruption, demilitarize the Niger Delta, and respect the voice of ethnic minorities. But, they were wrong. The partnership between the oil companies and the state prevailed over the community’s pledge and violence kept escalating (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011).

In 1999 the new democratically elected government reasserted ownership over petroleum and increased the share of oil revenue from 3% to 13%. It did not change

regulations for the oil industry or tackle the social, economic, and environmental problems of the Niger Delta. The Ogoni and Ijaw people were frustrated. In 2005, they asked for a share of 25% of the oil revenue. The proposal was rejected. As a consequence, tension between the national government and the community increased (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011).

Additionally, elections brought more violence to the region. Conflicts for power dominance within and between the different ethnic groups living in the Niger Delta increased. Election candidates hired youth and gave them weapons to “protect themselves, to fight political opponents, and to intimidate potential voters to vote for the right candidate” (Achegbulu, Bagaji, Maji & Yakubu, 2011, p. 39).

Militants realized war was a profitable business. By 2006, MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) and other militant groups that used to fight for better opportunities for their communities became insurgent groups. Even though their discourse was still attached to the community pledge, greed was driving their actions. Political agreements, economic interests of militant groups’ leaders, and desire for power were behind guerrilla tactics such as kidnapping, looting oil and attacking petroleum infrastructure (Boas, 2011)

Escalation of violence in the Niger Delta seemed to be unstoppable. The government’s armed forces could not resist the attacks by the militant groups. The oil companies threaten to close operations in the country. The oil industry, which included the state, was losing money “by March 2009, crude oil exports had fallen to 1.6 million bpd, down from 2.6 million in 2006” (Agbibo, 2012, p.53).

In 2008, the government commissioned a group of scholars to build a long-term plan to reach sustainable peace in the region. The Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) wrote a comprehensive peacebuilding plan. They underlined the necessity to ensure security, fight poverty and corruption as well as to increase community participation in the decisions about the region. In 2009, Nigerian President Umaru Yar'adua, motivated by the “reduced income from oil by 40 percent, and threatened national stability” (Uyi, 2012, p. 17) implemented one of the NDTC’s suggestions: the Amnesty Program, which will end in 2015.

Starting in 2009, the government granted forgiveness to all militants who surrendered during the 60 days following the announcement of the Amnesty Program. Most militants groups signed it, but not all their members decided to participate.

The first phase of the Amnesty Program was disarmament. Global leaders considered it a success (Omadjohwoefe, 2011). However, the lack of trust in the government motivated some militants to keep part or the armament in case they needed it again (Agbiboa, 2013). Currently, there is an unknown amount of armament and munitions used in sporadic militant attacks (Oloduro & Oloduro, 2012).

Demobilization was the second phase. The imprecise criteria to identify militants raised doubts about the reported success of this part of the process. It seems that non-militants took advantage of the benefits of the Amnesty program. These concerns were raised by the fact that monthly payment for ex-militants was \$409.78, “three times the average salary for a young public sector worker” (Agbiboa, 2013, p. 54).

Currently, the government is implementing the third phase of the process. Militants have complained about the program's failure to fulfill its promises. For example, training has not been coherent with the job opportunities in the region and education centers do not have the proper infrastructure. There has not been implemented a strategy to create new jobs or support ex-militants to start their own businesses (Agbiboa, 2013; Omadjohwoefe, 2011).

Even though the Amnesty Program has helped decrease the frequency and intensity of violent encounters in the Niger Delta, scholars, opinion leaders, and NGOs have critiqued its implementation and doubt its capacity to bring sustainable peace to the Niger Delta (Agbiboa, 2013; Oloduro & Oloduro, 2011; Omadjohwoefe, 2011). According to Omadjohwoefe (2011), "amnesty is silent about the plight of the Niger Delta people that caused and reinforced violent agitations in the region" (p. 225). The economic prosperity that came with the reduction of violence has not changed the lack of development of the region. Unemployment, lack of a proper education system, as well as high level of pollution are just few of the problems the Niger Delta community still faces (Obi, 2011).

Consultations during the construction and implementation of the Amnesty program have been limited to high-level members of the government, members of the Niger Delta's social elite, and the leaders of the militant groups. Grassroots organizations, militants, victims of the conflict, as well as youth and women movements have been excluded despite their key role in the conflict and its transformation. Additionally, the program prioritizes the demands of the insurgency groups, which has

also frustrated the Niger Delta people, who feel they have been left out one more time (Oloduro & Oloduro, 2012).

Currently, the Niger Delta is getting to the end of the Amnesty Program. The lack of projects focused on sustainable peace raises doubts about the stability of the existing low level of violence in the region. After President Umaru Yar'adua died in 2010, Goodluck Jonathan, former Vice-President and member of the Ijaw group, assumed the presidency of Nigeria. Next elections will be held in 2015, same year as the Amnesty Program ends.

The Nature of the Conflict

The ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta can be traced to the beginning of the last century. Tense relations between the majority and minority ethnic groups have existed in the country even before Shell drilled the first oil well in 1958. However, the intensity and durability of this ethnic conflict was exacerbated by the arrival of the oil industry to Nigeria. (Shankleman, 2006). Idemudia & Ite (2006) explain the oil conflict in the Niger Delta based on four interrelated factors: political, economic, environmental, and social.

Political Factor

Since Independence in 1960, Nigerian government has tried to establish the country as a leader in Africa. The oil revenue has positioned Nigeria, as one of the richest countries in the continent and its military forces have been deployed as peacekeepers to countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, a weak or non-existent democracy as well as ethnic and religious conflicts throughout Nigeria has undermined its international influence (Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003).

The situation in the Niger Delta is one of the issues that make Nigeria an instable state. This region has been home of minority ethnic groups while the government has been ruled by major groups. The Nigerian government has kept the Niger Delta community away from contributing on decisions affecting the region since before independence from England in 1960 until today (Ibaba, Ukaga, & Ukiwo, 2012). The lack of representation in political positions has left the Niger Delta community powerless to improve their living conditions. This situation has been worsened by the country's corrupt practices and by the predominance of military governments until 1999 that used violence to repress critics (Ibaba, Ukaga, & Ukiwo, 2012).

The discomfort of the Niger Delta communities with the government's decisions increased with the arrival of the oil business. Contrary to expectations, economic advantages of petroleum produced in the region has not improved the underdeveloped situation of the Niger Delta (Achegbulu, Bagaji, Maji, & Yakubu, 2011). The community has tried to have a political voice. Attempts of secession were followed by peaceful protests that received violent response from the military governments. As a consequence, militant forces emerged from the community to resist the power of politicians and oil companies. By 2006, these groups mutated into insurgent organizations moved by greed and self-interest (Boas, 2011).

Economic Factor

Nigeria plays a key role in global energy. According to the U.S Energy Information Administration (2013), Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and by 2012 was the

fifth oil exporter in the world. Since 1970, Nigeria's economy has depended on the oil business, which "account[s] for about 90% of [its] gross earning" (Odularu, 2008, p.7).

Under the Decree No 51/ Petroleum Act of 1969 the Nigerian government declared ownership over the petroleum of the country. Therefore, it is in charge of renting the land to the oil companies and managing the revenue that comes from it (Omeje, 2008). The Niger Delta Community perceives the distribution of the oil revenue as unfair. Less than 20% goes to the local government and the community has scarcely benefited from it (Vaughn, 2007). In the Niger Delta, the economic wealth of the extraction business has mixed with deficient political infrastructure and high levels of corruption that maintain the already poor social, environmental, and economic conditions of the region (Omeje, 2008).

Another major economic factor of the Niger Delta conflict is the change in the use of land. The Nigerian government has expropriated the farmland of more than 10,000 families in order to build the oil infrastructure –roads, pipelines, and drilling wells- (Idemudia & Ite, 2006). It has increased unemployment and poverty in the region as well as contributed to the destruction of the soil and river (Conolly & O'Rourke, 2003).

Environmental Factor

Water and soil contamination as well as pollution related with the oil industry, have diminished the quality of life of the community in the Niger Delta (Odoemene, 2011).

Only in 2001, Shell reported 115 oil spills that summed up with the ones reported by other companies as well as operational leaks impacted the quality of water in the region (Opukri & Ibaba, 2008). Additionally, the exploration and extraction phases of oil require

the use of large quantities of water, which gets contaminated, and then is returned to the soil, rivers, and sea. Water contamination puts people at risk of contracting diseases and affects marine animals as well as crops (Conolly & O'Rourke, 2003). According to Amnesty International (2009) "The majority of the Niger Delta's population has no access to potable water. Many communities depend on untreated surface water and wells for drinking water" (p. 25).

Oil pollution is inevitable in the oil business. Drilling wells emit pollutants that contribute to climate change, cause health problems and risk the ecosystems (Conolly & O'Rourke, 2003). For example, in the Niger Delta pollutants have affected fishery, which damages the reproductive system of animals and decreases the amount of fish in the region. It has raised concerns about people being directly exposed to chemicals through ingestion of fish (Amnesty International, 2009).

The state's failure to regulate the oil industry has given the oil companies an "autonomy and license to do [what] they want" (Watts, 1999, Pag. 8), despite the community's wellbeing. In Nigeria there are no entities in charge of overseeing the environmental practices of the oil industry. It used to be the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment, but after 2007 the Federal Environmental Protection Act forbids this instance to enforce regulations to the oil industry. Currently, oil companies have the autonomy to control, investigate, and solve any environmental damage cause by the exploration, extraction, and transportation of oil in the Niger Delta, which raises doubts about the transparency of the environmental procedures adopted by the oil companies (Amenesty International, 2009).

Social Factor

The Niger Delta community perceives the arrival of foreigners and the government's ownership of the oil land as a threat to their identity. Local people witness how outsiders exploit their natural resources, change the economic system of the region, start new settlements, and disrespect the traditions of the community (Watts, 1999). They feel like strangers in their own town. The community has realized that if they do not participate in the decisions regarding the oil industry –regulation, employment, and benefits- their land and ethnic traditions will be alienated by the power of the government and the oil companies (Vaughn, 2007).

The government and oil companies' interest in protecting the oil infrastructure has motivated an increase in military and private security presence. These groups are well known for using repressive tactics to neutralize the community protests (Lujala, 2009). It has exacerbated the community distress and opened doors to the formation of militant groups in charge of forcing the government and oil companies to answer to the community's pledge (Watts, 1999).

This situation has been enhanced by high rates of unemployment among the youth who have decided to join the militant groups in order to obtain money and fight against the government and oil companies. They blame the oil industry for leaving little farmland to make agriculture and fishery competitive businesses (Lujala, 2009)

Players in the conflict

The Oil Industry

Oil companies working in Nigeria have to partner with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the government-own oil company. In this country Shell Petroleum Development Company and Chevron are the main oil companies working in the Niger Delta.

Government

The role of the government on the Niger Delta conflict has been defined by its centralized political system, economic dependence on the oil industry, high levels of corruption, and military culture.

In 1969 the Nigerian government decided to centralize the ownership of the country's natural resources, including petroleum, which represents 90% of the state revenue. The central government receives the payment from the oil business and then allocates a percentage to the regional government, which is in charge of ensuring the proper investment of the money in the human, social, and economic development of the Niger Delta (Idemudia & Ite, 2006). It has created a national and regional dependence on the oil revenue, which has translated into a rich government with no incentives to strengthen the political institutions. Nigerian leaders are more interested in obtaining personal benefits from the oil industry than in caring for the country or community's wellbeing (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji & Yakubu, 2011).

In Nigeria there is a breach between national and regional governments. The first holds most of the power, while regional institutions have a passive role in the decision-making process (Ibaba, Ukaga, & Ukiwo, 2012). This situation becomes hazardous because of the ethnic divisions within Nigeria, in which major groups are in power and concentrate the wealth of the country. It leaves minority groups with less advantage and outside of the priority agenda of the government (Ibaba, Ukaga & Ukiwo, 2012).

The centralization of power places the national government as the most important player in the economy of Nigeria. Its most valuable partners are the oil companies and citizens are dispensable stakeholders. The relationship between the government and the oil companies is so strong than scholars such as Ako (2012) asserts that “in Nigeria, Shell is the state” (p.2). Only when the Niger Deltans endanger the stability of the oil business the government pays attention to them. This attention has come in the form of military tactics aiming to repress people’s protest (Hill, 2012).

According to Hill (2012) this “establishment of the state as the most important economic factor has made political positions and influence vital to economic success and personal prosperity” (p.71) in the Niger Delta. People run for elections or support candidates because they know it is the only way to have access to the benefit of the oil industry. It “has resulted in the lack of accountability, transparency, and openness in resource use and management” (Ibaba, Ukaga & Ukiwo, 2012, p.6). The economic wealth of the Niger Delta is in the hands of few (Hill, 2012). This is true in the national level run by the major ethnic groups, and also in the regional level where local clans and community leaders are now corrupt.

Actually, high levels of corruptions have deteriorated the political institutions in the Niger Delta. It has opened the doors for informal arrangement between the politicians and local elites or godfathers who sponsor political candidates, bribe the community, and use violence to undermine opponents. In return, they ask for legal freedom to run illegal businesses, allocation of contracts, or any other personal or commercial favor needed to maintain their social and economic position (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji, & Yakubu, 2011).

Military forces have tried to control the Niger Delta community from protesting against the government. It is the result of a military culture established by the governments that ruled Nigeria from 1960 to 1999 (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji & Yakubu, 2011). The military has prevented Nigeria from falling apart and has protected the oil industry prioritizing the petroleum companies' interest over the community's needs. They have done it by using violence (Hill, 2012). According to international organizations such as Human Rights Watch the military have used practices such as rape, kidnapping, executions, and extreme use force to silence the Niger Delta community (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji & Yakubu, 2011).

During the '90s, violence was enough to control protests and activists. However, the military forces also inspired local youth to start their own militant groups, which have grown in strength and armament making hard to contain them. By 2009, the Joint Task Force –military and police- present in the region was unable to stop the escalation of violence in the Niger Delta. So, the government started the Amnesty Program to bring security for the oil industry (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji & Yakubu, 2011).

According to Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji & Yakubu (2011) “other than the oil factor, the mistrust and the lack of nationalism had endangered the internal stability of Nigeria” (p.38) and the Niger Delta. The centralized government and the country’s dependence on oil revenue generates more frictions between the major ethnic groups controlling the government and the minority ethnic groups living in the Niger Delta. The high level of national and regional corruption makes difficult for the community to benefit from the exploitation of their land, and the military culture of the country has institutionalized the use of violence as the way to deal with conflicts.

Oil Companies

Since 1958, the influence of the oil companies in the Niger Delta situation has been characterized by selfishness as well as lack of transparency and engagement with the host community. Oil companies have started social projects and established sustainability projects as a solely public relations strategy or as a tool to keep the community quiet (Frynas, 2005). This explains why most of the projects are not long-term and do not respond to the community’s need. For instance, Shell publicized the designation of special social budgets to areas where there are pipelines constructions, but as soon as it is done, the social budget is cut (Frynas, 2005). This double discourse is also seen in the environmental practices of the companies. Most of them advertise their “commitment to sound environmental practices, [...] however, [...] their environmentally insensitive processes of oil extraction in the Niger Delta are known to be the worst anywhere in the world.” (p. 265).

The partnership of the oil companies and government impacts the construction and implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility projects. The interest of the oil companies to please and secure the support of politicians suggests that development projects are closer to the political class's interest than to the necessities of the community (Frynas, 2005).

The tightness of the relation between the oil companies and the government also risks the transparency of the government as regulator of the oil industry (Aaron, 2012). According to Uyi (2012), "through infiltration of government parastatals and politicians the oil industry lobby is powerful enough to block legislations" (p. 15). An example is the restriction the National Environmental Standards has to overlook the work of the oil industry in the Niger Delta. This lack of control is added to the primary interest of the oil companies to avoid the high expenses related with prevention, respond, and cleaning of environmental damage (Uyi, 2012). These organizations are criticized for adopting operating standards way below those they adhere to in developed countries" (Ako, 2012, p. 11).

Additionally, the oil industry has supported the use of violence as a response to the conflict in the Niger Delta. During the '90s, they constantly asked the government to increase the number of military forces in charge of ensuring the security of the oil infrastructure and their employees (Ako, 2012). Later, oil companies started to hire ex-militants to deal with community protests and put together a private security force to serve the oil companies' necessities. For instance, in 2009 Shell "spent \$75 million on [...] unexplained security expenditure' and such cash payments is contributing to fueling crisis in the region claiming about 1.000 lives annually' (Uyi, 2012, p. 17)

Only recently oil companies have started to consult their Corporate Social Responsibility projects with the community. They are still finding out how to engage the people from the region, and ensure transparency as well as accountability in their social projects. However, historically, oil companies have done little to respond to the community concerns and take responsibility of the oil industry impact in the region (Ako, 2012). Therefore, their challenge is to heal and build their relation with the community.

During the first decades working in the region, the oil companies limited their social and environmental practices to the lousy regulations imposed by the government (Uyi, 2012). This behavior was not sustainable. In the '90s oil companies suffered the economic and reputational impact of their lack of attention to local stakeholders. The community raised their pledge worldwide, the Ijaw people demanded Shell to leave the Niger Delta, and militant groups attacked pipelines and kidnapped oil companies' employees as a protest (Obi & Aas Rustad, 2011). Then, the oil companies realized they needed to have the community on their side. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) became important when communities started to demand a responsible behavior from corporations, specially from oil companies whose impact to the host communities is high (Olufemi, 2010). In the Niger Delta, this impact goes beyond environmental damage. It has also exacerbated the economic and social problems of the region (Uyi, 2012).

After violent confrontations with the community and because of the boom of CSR programs around the world, oil companies started to run social projects in the Niger Delta (Aaron, 2012; Olufemi, 2010). First, their initiatives were gifts. What to give was decided based on what the companies perceived the community needed: new roads, schools, health centers. This paternalist approach created dependence on aid and did not address

the community grievances (Aaron, 2012). Therefore, oil companies were still facing lack of community support and high levels of violence.

In 2005, Chevron and Shell assumed a new approach: the GMoU or Global Memorandum of Understanding. Each organization implemented it separately but both had as the main philosophy to work with the community “to maximize economy of efforts and resources” (Aaron, 2012, p.266). Chevron partnered with New Nigeria Foundation to negotiate with the community. It also started Regional Development Councils (RDCs) to review, implement, and audit community projects. Representatives of the “NDDC [Niger Delta Development Commission], donors, NGOs, and State and Local Governments” (Aaron, 2012, p. 266) conformed this council. Chevron’s methodology accomplished a faster implementation of projects as well as increase on community engagement (Aaron, 2012).

Shell’s implementation of the GMoU has been more criticized. It created 67 clusters in charge of the implementation of the projects across the communities where the company operates. The Cluster Development Board (CDB) has built a close relationship with the government and neglected its engagement with the community. Shell has affirmed that funding for development projects is secure as long as there is not conflict in the region (Aaron, 2012). By 2008, under the GMoU, Shell had implemented 78 projects, but its reputation among the Niger Delta communities had not improved. Critics of Shell’s GMoU assert that the company advertises more than it has done. They doubt the projects have benefited the community and affirm that the GMoU implementation has been reckless because the priority of Shell is to start the program fast instead of effectively implement initiatives (Aaron, 2012).

It is important to notice that oil companies are not supposed to take the responsibility of the government on the future of the host communities. Despite the organization's involvement in social projects, making profit is what drives their decisions (Aaron, 2012). The problem comes when the goal of making profit surpasses the principles of transparency and accountability that every organization must have. In developing countries, such as Nigeria, the operations of multinational organizations "are hardly transparent as financial dealings are sometimes inflated to increase profit" (Uyi, 2012, p.16).

The Niger Delta Community

The Niger Delta is home to several minority groups. Among them, the Ogoni and Ijaw people are the most active in fighting for their community's rights. They have powerlessly witnessed how the government has given their land to the oil companies. Their traditional power structure has been ignored and foreign political structures have ignored the voice of local people. Additionally, the arrival of international organizations as well as people from other regions of Nigeria has endangered the minority groups' traditional values and customs.

Before Nigeria existed as a country, the Niger Delta ethnic groups were already there. After 1958, their agricultural land rapidly became the center of oil production in Nigeria. So, when the government took ownership over petroleum and the oil business started to threaten the sustainability of the region, the local community began to fear the extinction of their ethnic groups. Niger Deltans have witnessed the invasion of their territory and the violation of their rights as owners of the Niger Delta region. They feel

entitled to decide how their land is used and how the oil revenue is distributed and invested (Dibua, 2005).

Elders and secret societies used to be part of the social and political structure of the Niger Delta ethnic groups. They were in charge of making major decisions, ensure the sustainability of the group, and mediate in conflicts. Their word and actions were respected and followed by the rest of the community. Oil companies and the government ignored it (Ikuomola, 2013).

Before 1999, the national government repressed the ethnic political structures and violently kept them marginalized from regional decisions. Then, the newly democratic system dragged elders and community leaders into corrupt practices (Ikuomala, 2013). As a consequence, the credibility and influence of ethnic traditional structures has decreased. Currently, young people see elders as “corrupt, inept, and the epitome of colossal failure” (Odoemene, 2011, p. 128). The lack of respected people to lead the community pledge has opened space for more violence and has given more power to the militants group (Odoemen, 2011).

Young people are the most likely to follow the path of violence. They are frustrated by the government’s failure to promote job opportunities, education, and a better future. They grew up witnessing how their parents’ and grandparents’ peaceful attempts to achieve prosperity and development were violently destroyed, while militant groups’ practices such as kidnapping and bombing have been effective on getting the oil companies and government’s attention (Bagaji, Achegbulu, Maji, & Yakubu, 2011).

Women also play a key role in the Niger Delta situation. The environmental damage that results from the oil business has endangered women's capacity to make sure there is enough food at home. They have lost their value as the person in charge of properly feed their family, which has increased violence against women (Dibua, 2005). As a consequence, in the Niger Delta, women motivate their sons to join the militant groups in order to fight against the oil industry (Ikuomola, 2013).

The arrival of foreigners to the Niger Delta has also changed the set of values and customs of the community. Prostitution, sexual assault, and unwanted pregnancies have become common in the Niger Delta risking the traditional structure of the ethnic families. Foreign men working in the oil business arrive to the region with money and without knowledge or respect for the local traditions (Odoemene, 2011, p. 130).

New generations are not interested in continuing their ethnic traditions. They are looking up to and taking after western cultures and religions, disregarding what their own culture teaches them. The influence of foreigners has been joined by the lack of support from the government to preserve ethnic traditions. For instance, western medicine has been imposed ignoring traditional medicine and increasing the community's fear of the disappearing of their culture (Ikuomala, 2013).

The Niger Delta community's demand for "self-determination, resource ownership and control" (Odoemene, 2011, p.126) of their land is motivated by their fear of disappearing. Since oil was found in 1958, the Niger Delta community has progressively lost their territory, which they inherited from their ancestors and used to be their source of subsistence. Imposed modern political structures have left aside ethnic

ones. Also, youth and women perceive it is more prosperous to follow western customs because money and statutes are related with foreigners. These changes have caused disequilibrium in the region, weakening the ethnic groups' ability to lead the pledge of the community in a peaceful way.

Chapter 2: Conflict, Oil, and Communication

Intractable intra-states conflicts

Conflicts are part of people's life. When managed in a positive way, conflicts help communities and individuals evolve and become more resilient. But when conflicts are approached with violence or not approached at all, they undermine the survival of those involved: violence escalates, players' positions polarized, the perception of non-solution becomes the rule, and people only see the possibility of having a winner and a loser or just losers (Littlejohn & Domenici 2001). When conflicts continue for long time and multiple attempts to reduce violence fail, they are considered intractable (Coleman, 2003). Intractable intra-states conflicts are strengthening all around the world (Levy, 2013). By 2005 "about 40% of (...) armed conflicts [had] persisted for 10 years or more, with 25% of the wars lasting for more than 25 years" (Gray, Coleman, & Putnam, 2007, P.1416).

According to Lederach (1997), intractable conflicts are identity conflicts. They are maintained through the narratives of the players and violent behaviors are used as a form of protection (Gray, Coleman, & Putnam, 2007). Violence is the first attempt to fight the conflict and after a while the players find themselves involved in a situation where reconciliation does not seem possible (Bar-Tal, 2007). Coleman (2003) explains

intractable conflicts through five categories: “[the] aspects of context, the issue, the relationships, the process, and the outcomes of the conflict” (p.7).

The Context

The context of regions dealing with intractable conflicts is instable. It is marked by the exclusion of the voice of the powerless (Coleman, 2003) that feel they cannot control or participate in decisions that affect their lives (Lederach, 2004). The powerful players of the conflict prioritize the necessities of their own group, excluding the pledge of the minorities. In such cases, the less powerful become victims of injustice and face threat to their survival (Coleman, 2003).

The Issue

Regions dealing with intractable conflicts face issues related to human and social dilemmas such as, stability VS change, short-term VS long-term goals, as well as efficiency VS inclusiveness. In intractable conflicts usually more than one dilemma are involved. They also connect tangible and non-tangible elements. For instance, in the Niger Delta conflict the community’s fight against water pollution -tangible- includes the health issues but also the destruction of the traditional role of women who feed their families by fishing -intangible. As a consequence, the water pollution acquires an emotional meaning that influences the perception of “What is good, moral, and right in any given conflict setting” (Coleman, 2003, p. 19).

The response of the players to the social dilemmas is diverse and linked to people’s perception that there is not way out of the conflict. Some people deny that there are different perspectives of the problem. Others distrust or ignore certain parts of

information so they do not have to deal with the complexity of the issue. The majority focuses in the differences with the other players. They just want to support arguments that justify their position (Coleman, 2004).

The Relationship

The relationship among the players of intractable conflicts is distant and disconnected. Each player is focused on its interest and fears. They build narratives to “construct a sense of meaning, responsibility, and value” (Coleman, 2004, p. 218), in which opportunities to work together, trust each other, and believe in a way out of the conflict are progressively lost (Bar-tal, 2007).

The Process

The process of intractable conflicts involves emotions and beliefs that are socially constructed. The way people interpreted their environment and react to it is learned through social interactions and become a tool to survive (Bar-Tal, 2007). According to Bar-Tal (2007), in intractable conflicts there are two main collective emotions: fear and hatred. Players fear to die, lose their traditions their family. They are victims of acts of violence such as massive killing, property destruction, and kidnapping. When threats to life are sustained over time it becomes part of every day life and reinforces the justification to use violence as a defense tool. Hatred comes from perceiving others as the perpetrators of harm. Parties of intractable conflicts build stories to support hatred. It results on labels such as enemy, allies, criminal, and victims.

Over time the complexity of the conflict increases. The narrative that keeps violence alive is passed and reinforced among each player until it becomes a “collective

emotional state” (Coleman, Gray, & Putnam (2007). The memories that justify these emotions are not necessarily based on facts. Instead, they are built from subjective interpretation of events as well as selective inclusion and exclusion of historical moments (Bar-tal, 2007).

The Outcome of the Conflict

The outcome of intractable conflicts is related to its durability and pervasiveness. Most of the players do not remember or have never lived peaceful times. They just know a violent environment in which killing, kidnapping, and rape are part of the routine. Therefore, violence is normalized permeating other social systems such as families, friendship, and workplace (Coleman, 2003). The long period of violence that characterized intractable conflicts changes the dynamic of interaction and the social values of those involved in the conflict. The necessity of each player to protect themselves, the negative perception of each other, and the lack of hope in a way out of the conflicts produce a cycle of violence that undermined the well-being of the players (Bar-tal, 2007).

Intractable Conflicts in oil regions

Oil is one of the most desirable natural resources of today’s world. Those who are part of its industry chain are considered powerful and wealthy, but some of them are also involved in violent conflicts (Huber, 2013). The arrival of the oil business in regions with intractable conflicts in countries such as Colombia, Nigeria, and Chad does not start violent interactions, but it enhances them (Shankleman, 2006). Violence is more likely to spur in oil-dependent economies with weak institutions (Lujala, 2009). There are two

main issues that connect oil and conflict: the environmental and the human impact (Vaughn, 2007).

The environmental impact of the oil extraction diminishes the quality of life of the host community. Water contamination puts people at risk of contracting diseases, destroys the soil, and maritime life. Forest destruction to build the extraction infrastructure changes the traditional agricultural businesses of the region. Also, the risk of oil spills endangers human lives and the ecosystem (Vaughn, 2007).

In weak governments, the environmental damage of the oil industry is enhanced by the lack of proper regulations. Usually, in these regions, oil companies have inefficient procedures to prevent and clean up oil spills as well as to decrease ecological footprint (Vaughn, 2007). When a legal complaint about the environmental damage gets to the regulatory agencies it is not effectively solved. Cases can stay in the legal loop for years. Additionally, oil spills are reported late in order to give space to the oil companies and government to present inaccurate estimations of the damage caused (Watts, 2005).

The arrival of foreigners undermines the traditions of the host community. The new people are richer. They lack of respect for the local customs, and promote a culture of exploitation (Vaughn, 2007). According to host communities the distribution of the oil revenue is unfair. In fact, it scarcely benefits them (Vaughn, 2007). The economic wealth that comes with the extraction business mixes with deficient political infrastructure as well as high levels of corruption in the oil companies and government that maintain the already poor social and economic conditions of the region (Bernauer, Bohmelt, Koubi, & Spilker, 2013). The community demands benefit from the oil companies' use of the

natural resources of the region and resent being abandoned by the government (Connolly & O'Rourke, 2003).

Using Communication to Transform Intractable Conflicts

Communication is part of arousal and transformation of intractable conflicts (Coleman, 2004). The socialization of narratives reinforces people's beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors toward conflicts. Initially, violence is used as a protection tool, but after a while it becomes regularized, considered as the only acceptable response, and blended into the culture (Gray, Coleman, & Putnam, 2007).

In intractable conflicts "the quality of communication is poor" (Fisher-Yoshida, 2012, p. 105). People build stories of blame, hate, accusations, and stereotypes about their counterpart (Ellis, 2006), which is joined by "strong feelings of anger, disgust, self-righteousness, and even fear" (Recigliano, 2005). These narratives are reinforced in formal and informal conversations and through every day interaction. The story of the conflict perpetuates in time when people pass it from one person to another and from generation to generation (Coleman 2004). It isolates the players of the conflict by reaffirming their "false or biased ideas, information, beliefs, or narratives" (Coleman, 2004). As a consequence, people cannot see their counterpart as negotiation partners. They only see them as enemies (Dudouet, 2006).

According to Coleman, Gray, and Putnam (2007), in order to transform intractable conflicts it is necessary to create a disruption in the narrative players use to explain their situation, including the discourse about enemies and allies. In this way,

violence is deinstitutionalized. Therefore, the lack of hope in achieving peace is reduced and possibilities to find common ground increase.

In this context, the role of communicators is to change the relationship between the players involved in the conflict by using “messages strategies to alter the psychological process between groups” (Ellis, 2006, p.140). Understanding the discourse of the different actors of the conflict is the first step of a process that goes from healing and reconciliation to collaboration (Broome, 2013). The long-term goal is to create a common narrative of respect, trust, and tolerance (Lederach, 2004).

Successful Experiences Changing Discourse

Public Conversations Project in Burundi

Burundi has been dealing with and intractable conflict since its independence in 1962. Ethnic rivalries between the major group, Hutu, and minority groups such as Tutsi and Twa motivated the increase of violence after the first democratic election in 1994. In 2001, the peace making process hosted by South Africa ended up with a commitment of ceasefire and the establishment of a power-sharing government. Violence decreased but has not disappeared from the country. Actually, after 2010 violent confrontations have sparked to resist the authoritarian government that is currently in power (BBC, 2014).

In 2006, Public Conversation Project Dialogue and Community Leadership Center started a project with the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa ethnic groups. People from each community came together to be trained on building and facilitating intergroup dialogues. They participated in workshops, conducted pilot dialogues with the support of experts,

and then went to their village to start dialogues in their own communities (Public Conversations Projects, n.d).

The goal of the dialogues was to restore the relationship among the different ethnic groups. They faced major challenges such as lack of trust, lack of confidence on peace accords, and extreme poverty (Fisher-Yoshida, 2012; Public Conversations Projects, n.d). However, the outcome of the project showed the ethnic groups that in order to build a better future, they needed to change their dynamics of communication (Fisher-Yoshida, 2012). Currently, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa facilitators are independently running dialogues in their community and have reached out to donors who can support more training (Public Conversation Projects, n.d).

Talking Drum Studio- Sierra Leone

During more than 10 years, Sierra Leone went through a bloody civil war. Diamonds, mercenaries, and political instability were at the center of the conflict. However, the richness of diamonds did not start violence. It just enhanced it.

The country got independence from England in 1961 and in 1967 a military government took power. In 1991 the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started one of the most intense violent conflicts Africa has ever gone through. RFU was known to be involved in illegal exploitation and dealing of diamonds. They used violent means to control the community and to keep ownership of the territory. The involvement of the military in the diamond business has not been proved but NGOs and watchdogs organizations were constantly indicating that it was true. Corporations and countries such

Liberia were also involved in the conflict. They were dealing with mercenaries to have access to the diamond mines (Bah, 2000).

In 1997 a joint effort of African countries succeed on bringing a civilian government in charge of leading the cease-fire agreement. In 2002, the peace agreement was finally signed (Abdalla, Shepler & Hussein, 2002).

In 2000, Search for Common Ground started Talking Drum Studio in Sierra Leone. They created five radio programs “to empower people to participate in building a tolerant and inclusive society for sustainable peace” (Search for Common Ground, 2002). This project intended to give voice to the community, start healthy conversations about the conflict, open doors for reconciliation, and spread information about the peace process. (Abdalla, Shepler & Hussein, 2002).

An internal evaluation of the project showed major changes in Sierra Leone people who started to see the value of having a voice and being informed. One of the most influential programs was Golden Kids News, which changed people’s attitude toward children. The community went from perceiving kids as lethal weapons use by mercenaries to recognize them as members of the community that needed to be protected (Abdalla, Shepler & Hussein, 2002). Overall, Talking Drum Studio-Sierra Leone influenced the narrative of the region by “addressing [...] the psychosocial aspects of the conflict: trauma healing, children reintegration, women issues, etc” (Abdalla, Shepler & Hussein, 2002, p. vi).

Peace Education. Israeli and Palestine Youth

Since the last century Palestinians and Israelis have been involved in one of the most complex conflicts in the Middle East. Until 1917, mostly Arabs owned Palestine. Then England unilaterally decided to promise this land to the Jewish people. At the beginning both communities lived together with minor tensions. Over the years the power of the Jewish community grew and after World War II the crisis in the region erupted. In 1947, the Jewish political forces created a Jewish state in Palestine. The United Nations validated this position. As a consequence, Arab countries in the Middle East began a fight against Israel aiming to recover the lost land and Arab people from the region joined the Palestine arm groups (Deeb, 2013). Since then, violence has increased and decreased over time, but their perception of each other as enemies has always been present (De Waart, 2001). Each side has a different narrative about the conflict and the reasons that have sustained violent interaction for more than 70 years. The Palestine and Israeli situation is “more complex and relate simultaneously to values, belief, and attitude, as well as the national and historical experiences of both people” (Dajani & Barakat, 2013, p. 66)

Between 2001 and 2002 Biton and Salomon studied how (2006) “the collective narrative of a group in conflict and participation in a peace education program affects youngsters’ perception of peace” (p.167). People aged 15 and 16 from schools in Palestine and Israel were involved in the program Pathways into Reconciliation. It included a three days retreat with youth from both communities. Before the program started most of the participants replicated the narratives of their community. Israelis reduced peace to absence of violent confrontations, while Palestine limited it to freedom,

rule of law, and emancipation. At the end of the program, both sides perceived peace as something positive and achievable. They were able to start Palestine-Israeli friendships and recognize the humanity of the other side. However, one of the conclusions of the study was that participants in the program never legitimated the narrative of their counterpart (Biton & Solomon, 2006).

Chapter 3: Discourse Analysis

Transforming conflicts requires modifying the relation of its players (Coleman, Gray & Putnman, 2007). In order to achieve this, it is necessary to change their discourse, which entails understanding it (Broome, 2013). The following paragraphs will explain the discourse used by the players of the oil conflict in the Niger Delta: oil companies –Shell and Chevron, the government, and the community.

The information analyzed has been extracted from press releases, reports, and news publications from 2009, starting of the Amnesty Program, until April 2014.

The categories of analysis follow Coleman’s categories to explain intractable conflicts: “aspects of the context, the issue, the relationship, the process and the outcomes of the conflict” (Coleman, 2003, p. 7).

The Context

Justice

Civilians have suffered the consequences of the arm’s conflict. During the ‘90s the government killed community leaders, soldiers raped women, and the oil industry was assumed to support deathly military interventions. The judicial system of Nigeria and the

oil industry failed to timely care for the victims. In 2012, Patrick, a citizen of Amassoma, said, “Those who lost people still feel the pains because there is no one to complain to and no justice. The culture of impunity is a major challenge” (Tomorrow is a New Day, nd).

Militant groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) use the lack of justice in the region as a justification for their violent practices. They claim to be pressuring the government to recognize the long-term abandonment of the region. “It is about time we confront 50 years of beating about the bush head on” (Baldauf, 2009), said a spokesperson of MEND in 2009.

Injustice is related to lack of proper regulations over the exploitation of Nigeria’s natural resources. The government has historically protected the oil industry and allowed them to adopt corrupt practices. Since 2009, the country has slowly tried to change it by creating institutions such as the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which aims to “develop a framework for transparency and accountability in Nigeria’s extractive industry” (Ogbonnaya, nd). However, these efforts are undermined by the culture of corruption that has characterized the Nigerian political class since independence from England.

Power

In Nigeria, the power is concentrated in the hands of the government, oil companies, and major ethnic groups in Nigeria. During the last decade, they have had faced the violent tactics used by militant groups to gain power in the Niger Delta. In July 2009, when MEND attacked an oil facility in Lagos, the major ethnic groups of the north

promised retaliation against the Niger Delta people. MEND released a statement implying they did not fear this menace, “‘Is the OPC (Oodua Peoples Congress) threatening to attack any Niger Deltan or a Particular state or tribe there? We have the Itsekiris, Osokos, Urhobos, Ijaws, Ibibios, Igbos, Efiks, so whom do they plan to attack first? Do they plan on attacking pipelines and oil companies and making our job easier of planning to destroy non-existent infrastructure?’” (Anonymous, 2009). This statement shows how the lack of hope of the people on the Niger Delta has become a weapon for MEND. The community does not fear losing anything because they do not have anything.

The Voice of the Community

The media in Nigeria is private. It claims to be objective in its content but there is a tendency to give more importance to certain regions (UNDP Nigeria, nd). In the case of the Niger Delta, National newspapers present the word of the oil companies, militant groups, and the government. However, there is no identifiable community leader, elder, or organization that stands out as the voice of the community.

International media has covered the conflict in the region when there are clear international implications. They present quotes from local people, but the articles are mainly supported by statements of international organizations. Some events covered by international media are: the Bobo community’s suit to Royal Dutch Shell in London (Mason, 2011), the rise of violence in the Niger Delta that motivated the Amnesty Program (Anonymous, 2009; Baldauf, 2009; Nossiter, 2009), as well as the report in which UNEP makes Shell and the Nigerian government responsible for the environmental destruction of Ogoniland (Eboh, Onuah, 2011).

In the international and national media, the main organizations carrying the voice of the Niger Delta people are the militant groups, especially MEND, or international NGOs such as Amnesty International. Non-militant grassroots organizations or community leaders rarely get quoted or covered in news publications.

The Issue

Security VS Development

Each player of the conflict in the Niger Delta approaches peace from a different perspective. In its discourse, the community implies that development is prerequisite to achieve peace while the government believes sustainable peace, understood as security, is prerequisite to achieve development. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs affirmed “Mr. President believes that if there is sustained peace in the Niger Delta, it would be possible for the Ministry of Niger Delta and its development partners to fix the problems in the region” (Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, n.d)

Actually, the Amnesty Program, the government’s most ambitious initiative to tackle the conflict in the Niger Delta, focuses on increasing security by giving money and training ex-militants. The community perceives the Amnesty program as another project in which they have been left out while the violent people have been rewarded.

Emmanuel, a member of the Niger Delta community, said, “I don’t know what the Amnesty has achieved apart from giving some criminals money every day” (Tomorrow is a New Day, nd).

The community keeps wondering what it is going to happen with them in the future. They do not see major accomplishments on fighting the impoverish situation of

the Niger Delta. Anyakwee Nsirimovu , chairman of the Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition, said, “As long as the equity situation is not solved, you will continue to have people who will blow up pipelines” (Nossiter, 2009). The Niger Delta people fears the oil business will destroy their way of living. Barilido used to be a fisherman, but because of the water contamination he had to abandon this way of living and start collecting wood. About the environmental situation of the Niger Delta he said, "The wind blows the oil on our vegetable crops, our food tastes of oil, our children are sick and we get skin rashes. Life here has stopped" (Vidal, 2013).

National VS Local

The government and major ethnic groups in Nigeria perceive the conflict in the Niger Delta as a localized issue that does not concern the whole country (Anonymous, 2009), while the Niger Delta people believe the oil conflict is a national problem. Frank Jonah, Chairman of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) released a statement in 2013 about the situation in Ogoniland saying, “While the resources of the Ogoni people are taken and shared by the major ethnic groups, Ogoni people are left to die in Shell Petroleum Development Company polluted land.” (Sotunde, 2013)

MEND has also taken a stand about this dichotomy asserting that the Niger Delta conflict is a national issue. According to them the situation in the Niger Delta has worsened because corrupt members of the northerner ethnic groups were leading the country “after their son, Olusegun Obasanjo wiped out Odi with innocent civilians and stole our commonwealth as the Minister of Petroleum. The Niger Delta issue may have

started in the Niger Delta, but the problem caused by injustice knows no boundaries. It is a Nigerian problem that should be enjoyed or suffered by all.” (Anonymous, 2009).

Roots VS Symptoms

According to the critiques of the CSR initiatives and the Amnesty Program in Nigeria, those initiatives address the symptoms of the conflicts but ignore its roots.

Shell’s main concern is oil sabotages. The organization’s main focus in its discourse is to urge the government and the community to stop the oil thefts. Mutiu Sunmony, Chairmal of Shell Companies in Nigeria said, “We find it difficult to safely operate our pipelines without having to shut them frequently to prevent leaks from illegal connections impacting the environment. (...) While SPDC continues to play its part in combating crude oil theft (...) the experience of the past few months requires more concerted efforts by all stakeholders, including government and communities” (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2013)

When talking about its Corporate Social Responsibility projects, Shell focuses on publicizing its monetary contribution. For instance, in 2011 the organization released a press release titled “SPDC Spends N5.53 Billion on Economic Empowerment Programmes in Niger Delta.” The communication does not address the community pledge. Instead, it focuses on micro-credit and training for agro and fishery industry disregarding the fact that the main reason people cannot succeed in those businesses is water and soil pollution caused by the oil industry.

Chevron recognizes its impact in the region. It focuses on steps to reduce its negative impact as well as the support to the development of the Niger Delta. Instead of

talking about investment, the organization focuses on addressing the root of the conflict. There are no mentions about who is to blame. It mainly talks about partnership with private sector, the community, and the government (The Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, 2013).

Security is at the heart of the government's Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta. However, there is not major initiative tackling issues such as unemployment, pollution, or health care. Sama Adami, member of the committee to study the issues in the Niger Delta said in 2009, "I don't think the amnesty as proposed will have the capacity to en violence in the Niger Delta. (...) The fundamental issues of equity and democratization that are driving the activity, there are not serious or effective proposal under way to deal with it" (Nossiter, 2009).

Elders of the Niger Delta ethnic groups have appealed to non-violent means to solve the oil conflict and justify the existence of militant groups by the lack of employment, and decent life conditions. They affirm that youth are not aggressive by nature. They demand the government to address the underlying issues of the conflict, instead of increasing armament. Patrick Aziza, traditional ruler of the Niger delta and former member of the army, said to the government "You solve this problem; if you solved it and the boys are still aggressive then you can say the boys are violent." (Anonymous, 2009).

Assuming Responsibility

Regarding the long-lasting situation in the Niger Delta and the few or none benefit received by the community from the oil business, Shell places the responsibility

in the government and approaches the community's lack of benefits from oil revenue as something from the past: "SPDC agrees that, in the past, not enough oil revenue has been returned to the oil producing areas for development purposes. SPDC and other Shell companies in Nigeria pay tax and royalties each year into the federal budget. The government then decides how to spend and distribute this money among the states" (Royal Dutch Shell PLC, nd).

In webchat with stakeholders Andrew Vickers, Vice President of Policy and External Relations of Shell, affirmed that NGOs target Shell more than other oil companies in Nigeria because the company is a "strong global brand." The organization ignored that events such as the Bonga oil spill, the most devastating spill in the history of Africa, and the long-term damage of Ogoniland, have contributed to violence in the Niger Delta.

The government's explanation of the conflict also detached itself from the responsibility and solutions of the situation in the Niger Delta. According to the official site of the Niger Delta Government "Poor corporate relations with the indigenous communities, vandalism of oil infrastructure, severe ecological damage, and personal security problems throughout the Niger Delta oil-producing region continue to plague Nigeria's oil sector." (Federal Republic of Nigeria, nd).

The Relationship

Among Governmental Institutions

Within the government there is a gap on the relationship between the different institutions and lack of a common discourse regarding who should take care of the

situation in the Niger Delta. National and local organizations publicly criticize each other. They recognize their poor performances and treat it as something normal without presenting future steps or special considerations. For instance, the state of Nigeria says on its website “The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was created to help catalyze economic and social development in the region, but it is widely perceived to be ineffective and opaque” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, n.d).

This can also be seen in the response of the national government to the 2013 report of the African Development Bank. The statement starts by presenting the advances Nigeria has made in poverty reduction. However, in the middle of it, the national government put the responsibility of the failure on eliminating poverty on the local states and affirms that the national projects, mainly related with policy, have been successful while the local initiatives have failed. “State governments hold the key to fighting poverty in their states. (...) Federal Government efforts are mainly at the policy level, while actual programmes are carried out by the state” (Niger Minister of Information, 2013).

The Government – The Community

The Amnesty Program has not helped heal the relation between the community and the government. The community sees that the benefits of this initiative only goes to the militants “I don’t know what the Amnesty has achieved apart from giving some criminals money every month” said Emmanuel from the city of Amassoma. The community is still suffering the impact of the oil industry and they perceive few changes have occurred since the Amnesty started.

The Niger Delta people are also afraid of ex-militants and resent the benefits they are receiving after committing crimes. A young member of the Niger Delta community affirmed “Do we need to cause wahala (trouble) in order to attend training in South Africa?” (Tomorrow is a New Day, nd).

However, the Nigerian government has noticed it has to come to agreements with the community. The creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was one of the tactics to decrease the “gap between the programmes of interventionist agencies and the expectations of the people in the region” (Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, nd). However, the media and the Niger Delta community doubt the efficiency and transparency of this Ministry. In 2012, the Niger Delta Budget Monitoring Group, said “Between 2009 to 2011, about N92 Million in aggregate had been allocated to feeding alone within this Ministry (...) when over a million people or more cannot afford a square meal daily in the Niger Delta the ministry was created to develop.” (John, Anthony, 2012).

The Oil Companies – The Government – The Community

When the players of the Niger Delta conflict address the problem of oil spills they engage in a discussion in which they recognize the problem, compromise to collaborate with the cleaning up, and blame each other.

In 2011 UNEP released the report on the environmental damage in Ogoniland. Shell and the government were held responsible for the situation in the region. Regarding this report, Mutio Sunmony, Shell Development’s Managing Director affirmed, “Oil spills in the Niger Delta are a tragedy and [Shell] takes them very seriously.” He

continued “Concerted efforts are needed on the part of the Nigerian government, working with oil companies and others, to end the blight of illegal refining and oil theft”. On the other hand, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the government-owned oil company, affirmed, “Pipeline vandalism, by the very communities who are affected, is the major issue.”

In the meantime, the community keeps silent and international NGOs are the ones advocating for them “Shell must put its hands up, and face the fact that it has to deal with the damage it has caused. Trying to hide behind the action of others, when shell is the most powerful actor in the scene, simply won’t wash” said Audrey Haughran, Amnesty International Global Issues Director.

Both Shell and Chevron changed their corporate social responsibility strategy in the first decade of this century. The new approach pretends to strengthen their relationship with the community and include the government in the implementation of the oil companies’ social projects. The results vary from company to company. Chevron has improved the relationship with the community but Shell has not.

After years of being apart from the community, in 2005 Chevron started to base its discourse on its role as member of the community. On its website the organization says, “The Company takes seriously its role as member of the community in Nigeria and its active in many projects promoting health, economic development and education” (Chevron Nigeria, 2013).

Chevron focuses on giving voice to the community. It empowers them to manage their own development. The company recognizes that the sustainability of its business

depends on the community's wellbeing (Chevron Nigeria, 2012). Actually, the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, Chevron's foundation in the region, bases its work on studies aiming to understand the community's necessities (Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, 2011, p. 3). This organization has been accountable and quarterly publishes the state of its social projects as well as the investments made on each one (Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, nd).

Shell focuses its communications on blaming oil thieves for the environmental damage in the Niger Delta. Its discourse is characterized by a defensive tone and anxiety. It is self-centered. It stresses on the company needs and problems, and verily addresses stakeholders' concerns.

Shell sees itself as an external player in the Niger Delta. It constantly stresses that the region "is chiefly the responsibility of the government, but SPDC has a role to play" (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011).

In the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU), Shell affirms that the community defines the placement of the budgets. The organization has used this role of the community to imply that the outcomes of the projects are responsibility of the Niger Delta people: "while some communities successfully managed their own decision-making and even raised further funds independently, others found it harder" (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011, p. 19).

Shell has to spend its resources explaining its decisions and denying allegations of wrongdoing. For example, in 2011, when the organization was divesting its equity from oil blocks, its stakeholders expressed concerns about the transparency of the process. The

organization issued a press release explaining that what it was doing was legal and the organization was taking into consideration the interests of all stakeholders (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2011). Moreover, in 2010 after allegations that Shell was illegally hiring ex-militants to secure the oil infrastructure, the organization released a communication denying it. Shell informed it was hiring surveillance contractors to “act as look-out posts, alerting law enforcements security agencies and SPDC of attempts to sabotage SPDC facilities in the area. “ (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2010).

Paradoxically, Shell affirms to “enjoying respect and trust from [their] host communities” (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2011). However, according to a study published by the Ecumenical Council for Corporate Social Responsibility, Shell’s “stakeholder engagement in the Niger Delta was generally rated as ‘poor’” (Aaron, 2012). Indeed, Wiwa, an activist with the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) said regarding the rumors that Shell was planning to return to Ogoniland, “even if we have to agree on resumption of oil exploration (...), we will not accept Shell back to Ogoniland.” Frank Jonah, MOSOP Coordinator Forum affirmed, “The problem we have with Shell is that it is not socially responsible” (Sotunde, 2013). Regarding the Ogoniland issue Shell said it lamented “the environmental cost of oil theft in the Niger Delta region” (Sotunde, 2013), but did not address the Ogoni people’s concerns.

The community does not believe in Shell’s corporate social responsibility actions. In events such as the 2008 Bodo oil spill, the Niger Delta people felt disrespected by the organization. In interview with Daily Telegraph, Nenibarini Zabbey of the Center for

Environment, Human Rights and Development, a grassroots organization in the Niger Delta, said that Shell Petroleum Development Company “presented as relief materials 50 bags of rice, 50 bags of bens, 50 bags of garri, 50 cartons of tomatoes and 50 tins of groundnut oil. Given the population, the Bodo people consider the offer by Shell as insulting, provocative and beggarly” (Mason, 2011). Shell’s behavior to alleviate the impact of one of the worst oil spills in the history of Africa showed its lack of understanding of the community and the careless approach to the negative impact the company has in the Niger Delta.

In 2012, the Bodo community sued Shell in London for this oil spill. Shell declined to talk about the lawsuit but they released a statement saying, “The great majority of oil spills in the Niger Delta are the result of third party interferences.” (Mason, 2011). In 2012, Mutiu Sunmonu, Managing Director of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, wrote a letter to the editor in the Times affirming, “Shell has long acknowledged the damage cause by oil spills. However, the real tragedy of the Niger Delta is not caused by oil companies, which contribute billions of dollars to government revenue and millions in direct support of community development, but by the action of criminals”. In this narrative, Sunmonu ignored that the issues of the Niger Delta, including looter, are not only related with oil spills. The company placed the responsibility of the situation in oil thieves ignoring the responsibility oil companies, including Shell, have had in the social, economic, and environmental situation of the Niger Delta.

Shell focuses its discourse in the economic investment and shows that it is the main probe of its community work. The company based its communication in awards

won and its economic contribution to the communities, warily addressing structured projects aiming to change the situation in the Niger Delta. Managing Director Mutiu Sunmonu said in 2011 “This is one of the biggest corporate responsibility portfolios operated by the private company in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it shows that we care for the wellbeing of the communities in which we do business” (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 2011).

The Process

Fears

The decrease in violence that followed the implementation of the Amnesty Program in 2009 did not reduce the Niger Delta community’s fear of losing their lives. A member of the community said, “For now, there is no reconciliation in the community because we are living in fear” (Tomorrow is a New Day, nd), while an ex-militant affirmed, “I am seen as a threat to the community. Yesterday night a mother and her child saw me and ran away.” (Tomorrow is a New Day, nd)

The Niger Delta community fears the devastating damage of the environment, and worries that the late response of the oil companies to the economic and social impact of oil spills increases violence in the region. A member of the Bodo community, Pastor Christian affirmed, "If the money had come, then people would have been able to restart their businesses. I lost everything in the pollution. Now nothing will change and poverty will only increase. “(Vidal, 2013) He affirmed that their legal retaliations against Shell are for the sake of future generations, “We don't want our children to suffer again like we did” (Vidal, 2013).

The oil companies fear about the future of their business in the region. They increase security to the petroleum infrastructure and invest on special tactics to protect their employees from being kidnapped or killed.

Labels

Militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) affirms they “fight for a fairer share of the country’s oil revenue to go to the dirt-poor people who are in the area,” (Anonymous 2009). The Nigerian government does not believe this philanthropic discourse of MEND and affirms that members of this group are “just criminals who sow chaos in order to steal vast amounts of the country’s crude oil” (Anonymous, 2009).

The Niger Delta community refers to the oil companies, especially Shell, as cruel organizations that brings sickness to the region and does not care about the lives of Niger Deltas. A citizen of Bayelsa said, “People are dying silently. The oil companies bring sickness to our communities” (Westby & Okoro, 2014). Chief Patrick Porobunu from the Bodo community shares this opinion, “Shell is cruel, very wicked. It has given us nothing again. People here are very angry. All we have is poverty because of Shell. We have no electricity, no health. Our suffering goes on.” (Vidal, 2013). Niger Deltas even go further and wonder if Shell’s disrespect for their people is a sign of racism “Is it because we are Nigerian and poor that they offer so little for the damage they have caused?” said one fisherman at the Bodo meeting. Another member of the community affirmed, “This would be different in the US or London. (...) Crude is the same in every country. Does the black man not also have red blood?” (Vidal, 2013)

Local governments also raised their concern about oil companies' behavior in the region. The Governor of Bayelsa said, "In our villages and communities, we can see what is happening; the accumulated effects of several years of oil exploration and exploitation; a regime of lack of transparency and accountability by oil companies, who are operating in this area because they have no respect for our laws and even our lives." (Eze, 2014)

Justification

Even though, the Amnesty Process is close to the end, militants are still active and still claim to carry the community's pledge. After an attack on the pipelines in Bayelsa state, MEND released a statement taking authorship of the attack and informing it was a response to the corruption of the government and the lack of attention to the region's needs " Unfortunately, the extremely irresponsible, floundering government of Nigeria is more concerned with enriching themselves and family members than attending to the problems of the Niger Delta and the continuously depreciating standard of living of the ordinary Nigerians" (Baldauf, 2012). It is important to notice in this statement that MEND does not close the paragraph by only taking the voice of the Niger Delta people, the group has expand its advocacy discourse to all Nigerians who are not attached to the government.

The Outcomes

Peace

The government perceives peace as security while the community perceives peace as employment, fresh water, health system, and education. Shell and Chevron have two different perspectives of what peace looks like. Shell focuses on security and economic

development, while Chevron believes the path to achieve peace is based on “improving the standards of living of communities in the Niger Delta,” which will ultimately “improve investment climate for Chevron to conduct and grow its business in Nigeria” (The Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, 2013).

Failures to Solve the Conflict

In the Master Plan of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) there is recognition of the failure of former projects aiming to tackle the situation in the Niger Delta “There have been many attempts and many plans made in the past to improve the lives of the people of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Sadly, each ended with very little to show for the time and resources spent.” (Niger Delta Development Commission, nd). The NDDC continues by asserting they would change it “The Niger Delta Master Plan is different in its goals, focus approach, and will not suffer the fate of the others before it” (Niger Delta Development Commission, NA). However, the promises in paper do not correspond to reality. In 2013, the NDDC was the target of critiques by the Niger Delta Youth Movement that affirmed NDDC was responsible for unfinished projects in the Niger Delta (Ayobami, 2013). On the same year the report of the presidential monitoring committee on the NDDC disclosed mismanagement of resources and lack of control over the quality of projects (Anonymous, 2013).

The Amnesty Program has reduced violence in the region. However, oil companies and members of the government doubt this initiative can cause long-term changes conducive to peace. In the Royal Dutch Shell PLC’s 2010 sustainability report, the company said, “Although militant attacks have declined, industrial-scale oil theft and

illegal refining remains serious problem.” Also, the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta and Presidential Amnesty Program Chairman Kingsley Kuku affirmed, “We should have stopped paying N65,000 after pulling the militants from the creeks and fixing it at the minimum wage.” He continued, “To avoid further crisis, the programme should end in 2015” (Osa-Okundor, 2013).

Chapter 4: Recommendations

The oil conflict in the Niger Delta in Nigeria has similarities with conflicts in other oil regions around the world. While it can be difficult to design communications strategies that are effective across different cultures, countries dealing with the issues of oil such as Colombia, Yemen, and Algeria share characteristics that make this study applicable not only to the Niger Delta but useful in similar conflicts across the world.

These countries:

- Are oil dependent economies
- Have weak government
- Lack of proper regulation of the oil industry
- Have high level of corruption
- Have high level of poverty in the oil region

Sustainable peace requires long-term processes as well as changes in governmental institutions, the culture of the region, and the behavior of the players of the conflict (Ricigliano, 2012). This study does not pretend to suggest long-term for oil conflicts, nor does it offer short-term solutions for peace.

Communication efforts to change the narrative of oil conflicts start by changing the relationship between the players involved. It will, then, be possible to create a narrative based on respect trust and tolerance. In order for this to happen the following strategies should be in place:

1. Build a unified community voice

In the Niger Delta the community still does not have a voice. Sporadic attempts to resist the power of the government and oil companies have died after both failures and victories. The different ethnic groups from the regions rarely come together. They have not yet built a unified discourse to tackle the issues that affect them nor have they created leaders that carry the voice of the community.

Militant groups or international NGOs have taken on the defense of the Niger Delta people. However, if the community wants to have a seat at the table where decisions about its future are made, they need to have an agenda and someone to lead it.

The military government has destroyed former attempts to consolidate a community force. Nonetheless, the current landscape of the country is different than it was during the '90s. The government faces international pressure to strengthen its democracy, especially because of its interest to establish itself as a leader in the continent. Concern for the environment is a global trend. Oil companies are criticized for their lack of respect for host communities, which affects shareholders confidence in the stability of the business. Actually, corporate social responsibility is no longer an optional strategy. It is now a criteria used to evaluate the sustainability of oil companies and other corporations around the world.

Elders, community leaders, and grassroots organizations need to assume leadership on driving the Niger Delta people's demand for better education, adequate health services, and more environmental protection. They need to build a structure that allows them to facilitate the process of decision-making and develop skills in the community to transform conflicts using non-violent means. The first step is to rebuild the community's trust in elders, so they can engage the community in discussion of sensible topics and implementation of projects. In this process it is important to involve both women and youth.

Also, promotion of peace education in schools throughout the region will help develop skills such as mediation in children and youth. It will be useful for the transformation of everyday conflict and support long-term strategies to build peace in the Niger Delta.

2. Promote reconciliation

The long duration of intractable conflicts perpetuates hatred, fears, and injustice. For decades the Niger Delta people have suffered from violations of human rights. They have lost their land, and have seen the progressive destruction of their home region. In 40 years of military governments, more than 15 years of clashes between the militants and the military, as well as 50 years of dealing with the impact of the oil industry, Niger Deltans have seen friends and family die. They have had to leave their houses and agriculture fields. Now, as part of their grieving process, they need the government and oil companies to recognize their pain is real. Rebuilding the relationship among players

of oil conflicts requires reparation of the damage caused as well as a process of reconciliation.

None of this has happened yet. According to Philpott (2012), the process of reconciliation has six aspects: “building socially just institutions and relations between states, acknowledgment, reparations, punishment, apology and forgiveness” (p.4). It will ensure an environment in which justice is possible and people have the opportunity to heal past injustices. In this way, the players involved in the conflict can focus on building a future instead of focusing on the past.

The amnesty process in the Niger Delta benefited the militants but did not address the grievances of the community. Oil companies and the government describe the story of the region without recognizing the unjustified execution of community leaders in the ‘90s, the failure to judge perpetrators of human rights violations or the military abuse of power motivated by the lack of corporate social responsibility of oil companies.

The story of the Niger Delta needs to be built based on facts and agreements among all of the players. Families want to have fair trials to honor the memories of their loved ones. The community needs to believe there is a real intention to change the future of the region based on the recognition of past mistakes.

In Sierra Leone, *Talking Drum Studio*, a series of radio programs, helped in the reconciliation process that followed the diamonds conflict in the country (Abdalla, Shepler, & Hussein, 2002). In Nigeria, a similar initiative would allow players of the conflict to start conversations that socialize their emotions and stories about the conflict.

It would help them realize that there is more than one narrative including the human side of the other players in the conflict.

3. *Address the root of the conflict instead of focusing on interventions to control the symptoms*

Addressing only the symptoms of the conflict such as oil looting and militant groups has not brought peace to the Niger Delta. It has only momentarily decreased violence. As people begin to demand jobs, structural changes in the health system, proper education plans, and prevention of environmental damages, they also start to feel betrayed by the government and the oil companies, which seem to bring palliative solutions, instead of action to promote the long-term survival of the community.

Players of the conflict need to find common ground by deciding what peace will look like and the what path they will take to achieve it, but first they need to heal their relationship.

The experience of Burundi offers an example of the power of intergroup dialogues to move players of conflicts from an enemy-ally dichotomy to a position of collaboration (Broome & Halay, 2006). In the case of the Niger Delta, intergroup dialogues will allow conversations about the future of the community and agreements about further steps. This will open the opportunity to build constructive relationships between all sides of the conflict in order to create “mutual acknowledgment and increase respect by each party for the other” (Broome & Hayan, 2006, p.16). The intergroup dialogue will permit the creation of a different narrative through “talking and reasoning together” (Broome, 2013, p. 741). The ultimate goal of these dialogues would be to “affect political changes: to

impact on the dynamics of the conflict in ways conducive to peace” (Broome & Hayan, 2006, p.22).

4. *Place accountability and transparency at the heart of every communication*

In order to build constructive relationships in which cooperation is possible, it is necessary to promote a culture of trust among players of oil conflicts. It implies fights against corruption and congruence between promises and actions.

In the Niger Delta, decisions and projects made by oil companies or the government trigger concerns about corrupt practices. This distrust adds up to their ineffective communication with stakeholders; it has allowed the community, media, NGOs to create and broadcast their own version of the government’s and the oil industry’s intentions, which most of the time directly contradict the official pronouncements that have been set forth.

Transforming the conflict in the Niger Delta requires fight against corruption and a strict policy of accountability and transparency in every project that is run in the region.

Governmental organizations, national and local, need to periodically report their planning, progress, budget expenditure, and results. Corrupt official workers must be held accountable for their actions. The community should know who is at both the national and local level, as well as have access to an effective mechanism to denounce wrong practices. The government-owned oil company needs to disclose the conditions of its relationship with the multinational oil companies and report the distribution of the revenue.

The fight against corruption should be publicly lead by the government through: encouraging whistle-blowing, protecting people who speak up, and strengthening policies to discourage corrupt practices. The government needs to communicate the regulations to the Niger Delta people using language and channels familiar to the audience. It should include mechanisms to denounce and information on how to get advice on legal processes.

Oil companies also need to commit to using accountable and transparent processes. It mainly applies to the environmental standards, which should mirror the ones used in other countries, which adjusts to the characteristics of the Niger Delta.

Oil spills may happen, however, if the community knows what the oil companies are doing to prevent them and mitigate the subsequent impact of them, the Niger Delta people's response will be more positive. The community will be more likely to engage in campaigns to stop oil theft and inform the authorities about oil spills. Additionally Shell and other oil companies should, as Chevron is currently doing, report the planning process, progress, result, and budget allocation of their corporate social responsibility projects.

5. Establish a mechanism to promote two-way communication with host communities: Oil companies and government

Lack of proper mechanisms to communicate with host communities has motivated violence and increased the power militant groups have in the Niger Delta. In order to transform this oil conflict, the ethnic groups of the region cannot be left out of the discussions that affect their wellbeing. The government and the oil companies need to

listen to the Niger Delta people and acknowledge its elders and political structures. This implies knowing their concerns, being aware of their culture and traditions, as well as using proper channels of communication.

Currently, people in the Niger Delta receive information through the media, word-of-mouth, politicians, or realize that the oil company or government has made decisions when they see foreigners arriving in the region, new equipment in the field, or new warning signs on the road. Communities need to be informed in a timely manner and must have the opportunity to present their opinions to oil companies and the government.

Chevron has advanced on this point. Its discourse stressing that it is part of the community allows people in the Niger Delta to reach out to the company and expect conversations with the company instead of organizing protests or campaigns to get the company's attention.

By creating close relations with oil communities, it is easier for the government and oil companies to find solutions that benefit everyone and promote cooperation to tackle common problems. Additionally, the oil company and government have the opportunity to explain their projects, respond to questions, gain support, and anticipate difficulties in the implementation of new initiatives.

6. Build partnerships

Shell has not benefited from establishing a discourse based on blame and emphasizing the other player's responsibilities. Nor has prioritizing its influence on the government or elites and disregarding the importance of building partnerships with the community helped its case. On the other hand, Chevron has slowly improved its image in

the region by being proactive. The company places in the center of its speech solutions, results, and future projects. It is also looking for partnership with grassroots organizations and community leaders in the Niger Delta.

While Shell is correct in emphasizing the importance of the government's role,--the Nigerian government must lead the sustainable development of the Niger Delta.-- however, the entrance of the oil industry to regions like the Niger Delta has major impacts on the social, economic, and environmental life of host communities. Therefore, oil companies must assume a discourse and behavior that highlights their concern for the future of the region instead of placing themselves as external players.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The oil conflict in the Niger Delta is used as an example of how the oil curse manifests in countries with weak governments, under-developed oil regions, and petroleum-dependent economies. It shows that the arrival of the oil industry does not start intractable conflicts or trigger poverty, but it makes old ethnic and religious disputes more durable and intense. Economic, political, social, and environmental factors interact to suit the conditions for injustice, power asymmetry, and low empowerment of the community to influence the decisions about their future.

The players of oil conflicts struggle to agree on the priorities to build a better future. In the Niger Delta oil companies, the government, and the community have not decided if it is more important to tackle the security issue first or the development goals, or if they would get better results by solving the symptoms of

the conflict such as oil thefts or the root of the grievances like unemployment. Players of the conflict blame each other for the lack of long-term results to projects and for the on-going violent interactions among them.

The relationship among oil companies, the government, and the community is instable and distant. It is characterized by lack of trust and engagement. The government does not assume its role as regulator, so the disagreements between the oil companies and the community spreads to international spheres or they are not solved at all.

Fears, labels, and justifications are present throughout the history of oil conflicts. The community fears its extinction. The oil companies and the government fear the disappearing of the oil industry from the Niger Delta. They use labels such as criminals, corrupts, and racist to refer to each other. The necessity to protect their interests becomes the justification for their acts of violence.

The result is a conflict in which the players disagree on what peace is. They do not build projects together or take into consideration each other's positions. In part, it explains why multiple attempts to solve the conflict have failed to bring sustainable peace to the Niger Delta.

The characteristics of the oil conflict in the Niger Delta bring some lessons that can be adapted to other countries dealing with the same issues. The community, oil companies, and the government need to engage in long-term plans aiming to build a positive relationship among them.

Even though, this capstone brings guidance for social projects looking to achieve sustainable peace in regions with oil conflict, more research is needed. Ethnographic studies in the oil region as well as in-depth interviews would give more insights on player's hidden discourse about the conflict including non-official discourses as well as non-verbal communication. Additionally, it would be important to find out the differences between regions with deep religions rivalry such as Nigeria with others in which religions does not play a main role such as Colombia.

References

- Aas Rustad, S., & Obi, C. (2011). Introduction: Petro-violence in the Niger Delta - the complex politics of an insurgency. In C. Obi & S. Aas Rustad (Eds.), *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta* (pp. 12–25). London: Zed Books.
- Aaron, K. K. (2012). New corporate social responsibility models for oil companies in Nigeria ' s delta region : What challenges for sustainability ? *Progress in Development Studies*, 12(4), 259–273. doi:10.1177/146499341201200401
- Abdalla, A., Shepler, S., & Hussein, S. (2002). *Evaluation of Talking Drum Studio-Sierra Leone*.
- Achegbulu, J. O., Bagaji, A. S. Y., Maji, A., & Yakubu, N. (2011). Explaining the Violent Conflicts in Nigeria ' s Niger Delta : Is the Rentier State Theory and the Resource-curse Thesis Relevant ? *Canadian Social Science*, 7(4), 34–43. doi:10.3968/j.css.1923669720110704.054
- Adebajo, A., & Landsberg, C. (2003). South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons. In M. Baregu & C. Landsberg (Eds.), *From Cape to Congo : Southern Africa ' s evolving security challenges* (pp. 171–204). Boulder: International Peace Academy
- Ademola, V. (2011). Measuring Impact in Intervention Programming for Peacebuilding in Conflict Context. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3(3), 489–507.
- Adesopo, A., & Akinola, S. R. (2011). Derivation Principle Dilemma and National (Dis)Unity in Nigeria: A Polycentric Planning Perspective on the Niger Delta. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 4(5), 251–264. doi:10.5539/jsd.v4n5p251

- Agbiboa, D. (2013). Armed Groups, Arms Proliferation and the Amnesty Program in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Journal of the Third World Studies*, 30(2), 39–63.
- Ako, R. T. (2012). Re-defining corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Nigeria's post-amnesty oil industry. *African Journal of Economic and Management Studies*, 3(1), 9–22. doi:10.1108/20400701211197258
- Akoh, B., & Jagun, A. (n.d.). *Mapping Digital Media in Nigeria* (p. 96). Retrieved from <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-nigeria-20120813.pdf>
- Amnesty International. (2009). *Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution, and Poverty in the Niger Delta*. London.
- Anonymous. (2009, April 27). Nigeria: Niger Delta Urges Truce in Nigeria's Troubled Oil Region. *Asia News Monitor*. Bangkok.
- Anonymous. (2009, May 30). International: Getting Desperate; Fighting in Nigeria's Delta. *The Economist*, p. 50. London. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/223975777/1414310A51C3CF2C75F/1?accountid=12768>
- Anonymous. (2009, July 24). Nigeria: Commentary Urges State to Tackle Niger Delta Crisis with "Urgency." BBC Monitoring Africa. Nigeria.
- Anonymous. (2013, May 5). Jonathan Promises to Cleanse NDDC of Corruption. Vanguard. Abuja. Retrieved from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/03/jonathan-promises-to-cleanse-nddc-of-corruption/>

- Anthony, G.-H., & John, T. (2012, February 8). Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs: An Exposition on 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 Budgets: How the Minister Pauperize the People. Sahara Reporters.
- Ayobami, A. (2013, January 6). Niger Delta Group Wants Probe of NDDC Activities. *Premium Times*. Nigeria.
- Bah, A. (2000). Exploring the Dynamics of the Sierra Leone Conflict. *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, 29(1).
- Baldauf, S. (2009). Niger Delta Militants Vow More Attacks. *Christian Science Monitor*. Johannesburg.
- Baldauf, S. (2012, February 6). With Oil Pipeline Attack , Niger Delta Rebels Announce Return. *Christian Science Monitor*.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Socio psychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(11), 1430–1453. doi:10.1177/0002764207302462
- Barakat, Z. M., & Dajani Daoudi, M. (2013). Israelis and Palestinians: Contested Narratives. *Israel Studies*, 18(2), 53–69.
- BBC. (2014, March 22). Burundi Profile. *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13085064>
- Bernauer, T., Bohmelt, T., Koubi, V., & Spilker, G. (2013). Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research*. doi:10.1177/0022343313493455
- Boas, M. (2011). “Mende Me”: the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the empowerment of violence. In C. Obi & S. Aas Rustad (Eds.), *Oil and*

Insurgency in the Niger Delta : Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence
(pp. 126–136). London: Zed Books.

Brewer, J. (2013). Sociology and Peacebuilding. In R. Mac Ginty (Ed.), *Routledge handbook of peacebuilding* (First edit., pp. 159 – 170). New York, NY: Routledge.

Brock, J., & Eboh, C. (2012, July 17). Shell faces \$ 5 bln Fine Over Nigeria Bonga Oil Spill. *Reuters*. Abuja. Retrieved from
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/shell-nigeria-fine-idUSL6E8IHLKO20120717>

Broome, B. J., & Collier, M. J. (2012). Culture, Communication, and Peacebuilding: A Reflexive Multi-Dimensional Contextual Framework. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, 5(4), 245–269. doi:10.1080/17513057.2012.716858

Broome, C. B. J., & Hatay, A. J. (2013). Building Peace in Divided Societies: The Role of Intergroup Dialogue The. In *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication : Integrating Theory , Research , and Practice Building Peace in Divided Societies : The Role of Intergroup Dialogue* (pp. 627–663). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Brunnschweiler, C. N., & Bulte, E. H. (2009). Natural Resources and Violent Conflict : Resource Abundance , Dependence , and the Onset of Civil Wars. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 61(4), 651–674.

Bui-Wrzosinska, L., Coleman, P. T., Nowak, A., & Vallacher, R. R. (2007). Intractable Conflict as an Attractor: A Dynamical Systems Approach to Conflict Escalation and Intractability. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(11), 1454–1475.
doi:10.1177/0002764207302463

- Bulte, E. H., & Wick, K. (2006). Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse. *Public Choice*, 128(3-4), 457–476. doi:10.1007/s11127-005-9010-z
- Chevron. (2014). Chevron Increases Support for HIV Prevention in Niger Delta. Retrieved April 03, 2014, from http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/03182014_chevronincreasesupportforhivpreventioninnigerdelta.news
- Chevron Nigeria. (2011). Chevron and USAID Partner to Improve Living Standards in the Niger Delta Through \$ 50 Million Alliance. *Press Releases*. Retrieved April 03, 2014, from http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/02172011_chevronandusaidpartnertoimprovestandardsinthenigerdelta.news
- Chevron Nigeria. (2012). *2012 Chevron Nigeria Corporate Responsibility Report* (pp. 1–36). Nigeria.
- Chevron Nigeria. (2013, April). Nigeria in the Community. doi:10.1111/2041-9066.12008
- Coleman, P. T. (2003). Characteristics of Protracted , Intractable Conflict : Toward the Development of a Metaframework – I. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 9(1), 1–37.
- Coleman, P. T. (2004). Paradigmatic Framing of Protracted , Intractable Conflict : Toward the Development of a Meta-framework-II. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 10(October), 197–235.

- Coleman, P. T., Gray, B., & Putnam, L. L. (2007). Introduction: Intractable Conflict: New Perspectives on the Causes and Conditions for Change. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 50(11), 1415–1429. doi:10.1177/0002764207302459
- Connolly, S., & O'Rourke, D. (2003). Just Oil? The Distribution of Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Production and Consumption. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 587–617.
- Daley, P. (2007). The Burundi Peace Negotiation: An African Experience of Peace-Making. *Review of African Political Economy*, 34(112), 333–352.
- Dibua, J. (2005). Citizenship and Resource Control in Nigeria: The Case of Minority Communities in the Niger Delta. *Africa Spectrum*, 40(1), 5–28.
- Domenici, K., & Littlejohn, S. W. (2001). Constructing Conflict. In S. W. Littlejohn & K. Domenici (Eds.), *Engaging Communication in Conflict : Systemic Practice* (pp. 3–25). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Donald, E. (2011). Human Security and Sustainable Peace Building in Nigeria : The Niger Delta Perspective. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 4(1), 254–260.
- Eboh, C., & Onuah, F. (2011, August 5). UN Seeks Massive Oil Spill Cleanup ; Shell , Government Responsible for Contributing to 50 Years of Pollution in the Niger Delta , Report Finds. *The Vancouver Sun*. Abuja.
- Eweje, G. (2006). Environmental Costs and Responsibilities in Resulting from Oil Exploitation Developing Countries : The Case of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 69(1), 27–56. doi:10.1007/s10551-006-9067-8
- Eze, C. (2014, April 16). Dickson Blast Oil Companies Over Environmental Damage in Niger Delta. *Daily Trust*. Yenagoa. Retrieved from

<http://www.dailytrust.info/index.php/environment/21679-dickson-blasts-oil-companies-over-environmental-damage-in-niger-delta>

Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. (n.d.). History of the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. Retrieved April 04, 2014, from

<http://www.nigerdelta.gov.ng/index.php/the-ministry/history-of-mnda>

Federal Ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs. (n.d.). About Federal Ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs. Retrieved from <http://www.mnda.gov.ng/aboutus/>

Federal Republic of Nigeria. (n.d.). Nigerian Economy. *About Nigeria*. Retrieved from <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/economy>

Fisher-yoshida, B. (2012). Transforming Communication for Peace. In P. T. Coleman (Ed.), *Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace* (pp. 105–120). New York, NY: Springer New York. doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-3555-6

Frynas, J. G. (2001). Corporate and State Response to Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta. *African Affairs*, 100, 27–54.

Frynas, J. G. (2005). The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies. *International Affairs*, 81(3), 581–598.

Galtung, J. (2007). Mini Theory of Peace. Retrieved December 03, 2013, from <http://peacelearner.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/johangaltung-aminitheoryofpeace1.pdf>

Hill, J. N. . (2012). *Nigeria Since Independence. Forever Fragile?* (First., p. 173). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Huber, M. T. (2013). *Oil, Freedom, and the Forces of Capital* (p. 278). Minneapolis, MN, USA: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ibaba, S., Ukaga, O., & Ukiwo, U. (2012). *Natural Resources , Conflict , and Sustainable Development. Lessons form the Niger Delta*. (O. Ukaga, U. Ukiwo, & S. Ibaba, Eds.) (1st ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Idemudia, U., & Ite, U. (2006). Demystifying the Niger Delta conflict: Towards an integrated explanation. *Review of African Political Economy*, 33(109), 391–406. doi:10.1080/03056240601000762
- Ikuomola, A. D. (2013). Initiatives of Oil Producing Communities and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace Building in the Niger Delta. *Journal of Conflictology*, 34–43.
- Imobighe, T. A. (2004). Conflict in Niger Delta : A Unique Case or a “Model” for Future Conflicts in Other Oil-Producing Countries? In R. Traub-Merz & D. Yates (Eds.), *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea* (Vol. 11440, pp. 101–115). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Lederach, J (2004) *The Moral Imagination the Art. The Art and Soul of Building Peace*. New York: Oxfors University Press
- Leopold, M. (2005). “Why Are We Cursed?”: Writing History and Making Peace in North West Uganda. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 11(2), 211–229. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2005.00233.x
- Levy, J. S. (2013). International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War. In C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & P. Aall (Eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War* (Fourth., pp. 17–38). United States of America: United States Institute of Peace Press.

- Lujala, P. (2009). Deadly Combat Over Natural Resources. Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(1), 50–71.
- Mason, R. (2011, May 2). Shell Sued Over Oil Spill in Niger Delta. *Daily Telegraph*. London.
- Niger Delta Development Commission. (n.d.). The Regional Development Master Plan. *The Regional Development Master Plan*. Retrieved April 04, 2014, from <http://www.nddc.gov.ng/masterplan.html>
- Niger Delta Development Commission. (n.d.). About Us. Retrieved from <http://www.nddc.gov.ng/about us.html>
- Niger Delta Development Commission. (2013). Beware of Fraudsters. NDDC Boss Warns Contractors. *News & Events*. Retrieved April 04, 2014, from http://www.nddc.gov.ng/news_id5p.html
- Niger Delta Partnership Initiative. (2011). *Strategic Plan 2011 - 2014*.
- Niger Delta Partnership Initiative. (2012). *Niger Delta Partnership Initiative 2012. Quarterly Report: July-September*.
- Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. (n.d.). Health , Safety and Environment. Retrieved from <http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/HealthSafetyEnvironment.aspx>
- Nossiter, A. (2009, August 10). Nigerian Amnesty Plan Faces Difficulties. *New York Times*. Dakar. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/world/africa/11nigeria.html>

- Odoemene, A. (2011). Social Consequences of Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 4(2). doi:10.5539/jsd.v4n2p123
- Odularu, G. O. (2008). Crude Oil and the Nigerian Economic Performance. *Oil and Gas Business*, 1–29.
- Ogbonnaya, O. (n.d.). NEITI and the Petroleum Industry Bill. *Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative*. Retrieved from <http://www.neiti.org.ng/index.php?q=publications/neiti-and-petroleum-industry-bill>
- Okoro, O., & Westby, J. (2014). Burden of proof: Niger Delta communities learn the ropes of oil spill monitoring. *Live Wire*.
- Oluduro, O., & Oluduro, O. F. (2012). Nigeria : In Search of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty Programme. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 5(7), 48–62.
- Olufemi, O. (2010). Corporate Social Responsibility of Multinational Oil Corporations to Host Communities in Niger Delta Nigeria. *Ife Psychologia*, 18(2), 21–35.
- Omadjohwoefe, O. S. (2011). Amnesty Initiative and the Dilemma of Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 4(4), 249–259. doi:10.5539/jsd.v4n4p249
- Omeje, K. (2005). Oil conflict in Nigeria: Contending issues and perspectives of the local Niger Delta people. *New Political Economy*, 10(3), 321–334.
doi:10.1080/13563460500204183
- Omeje, K. (2008). Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Re-Engaging Rentier Theory and Politics. In K. Omeje (Ed.), *Extractive economies and conflicts*

in the global South multi-regional perspectives on rentier politics (pp. 20–45).

Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. (2013). 2013 World Oil Outlook.

Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from

http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/WOO_2013.pdf

Osa-Okundor, K. (2013, June 20). Why Amnesty Must End in 2015, by Kuku. *The Nation*.

Philpott, D. (2012). *Just and Unjust Peace. An Ethic of Political Reconciliation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Public Conversations Projects. (2007). *After civil war, there's dialogue*.

Putnam, L. L. (2006). Definitions and Approaches to Conflict and Communication. In S. Ting-toomey & J. Takai (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Communication : Integrating Theory , Research , and Practice* (First., pp. 1–33). SAGE Publications, Inc.

Ricigliano, R. (2012). *Making Peace Last: A Toolbox for Sustainable Peacebuilding* (First.). Paradigm Publishers.

Rosen, Y., & Salomon, G. (2010). Durability of Peace Education Effects in the Shadow of Conflict. *Social Psychology of Education, 14*(1), 135–147. doi:10.1007/s11218-010-9134-y

Ross, M. L. (2004). What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? *Journal of Peace Research, 41*(3), 337–356. doi:10.1177/0022343304043773

Ross, M. L. (2008, June). Blood Barrels Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict By Michael L.

Ross From Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008. *Foreign Affairs*, (503), 35–37.

Royal Dutch Shell PLC. (n.d.). The Ogoni Issue. *Environment and Society*. Retrieved

March 30, 2014, from <http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/ogoni.html>

Royal Dutch Shell PLC. (2011). *Sustainability Report*.

Shankleman, J. (2006). *Oil, Profits, and Peace. Does Business Have a Role in*

Peacemaking? (1st ed.). Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2011). Shell in Nigeria – Working

in a Complex Environment.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2009). Shell Settles Wiwa Case

with Humanitarian Gesture. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2010). SPDC Denies Awarding

Contract to ex-Militant. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2011). More Sabotage Spills in

Niger Delta Since SPDC shut Down Imo River Production. *Shell Petroleum*

Development Company of Nigeria.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2011). SPDC Restates Commitment

to Nigeria in Divestment Exercise. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of*

Nigeria.

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2011). SPDC Spends N5.53 Billion

on Economic Empowerment Programmes in Niger Delta. *Shell Petroleum*

Development Company of Nigeria.

- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2011). SPDC spent N9 billion on community development in Niger Delta in 2010. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2013). Global Memorandum of Understanding. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2013). Our Economic Contribution. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2013c). SPDC Raises Alarm Over Increased Crude Oil Theft. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2013d). The Operating Environment. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Shell Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria. (2012). SNEPCo clarifies reports of alleged fine for Bonga spill. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Sotunde, A. (2013). Shell Back At Ogoniland After Two Decades Of Absence. *Ventures Africa*.
- Sunmonu, M. (2011). An open letter on oil spills from the Managing Director of the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. *Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria*.
- Sunmonu, M. (2012, May 23). Shell and the Niger Delta Oil Spills: Letters to the Editor. *The Times*, p. 22. London.
- Tar, U. (2008). Rentier Politics, Extractive Economies and Conflict in the Global South: Emerging Ramifications and Theoretical Exploration. In K. Omeje (Ed.), *Extractive*

economies and conflicts in the global South multi-regional perspectives on rentier politics (pp. 46–69). Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group.

The Niger Delta Partnership Initiative. (2013). *The Niger Delta Partnership Initiative. In Review 2010-2013*.

Ting-toomey, S., & Oetzel, J. G. (2001). Intercultural Conflict : An Introduction. In S. Ting-toomey & J. G. Oetzel (Eds.), *Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively* (pp. 1–26). SAGE Publications, Inc.

Tomorrow is a New Day. (n.d). Testimonial and Statistics. *Tomorrow is a New Day*. Retrieved April 06, 2014, from <http://www.tomorrowis anewday.org/impact/testimonials>

Udofia, D. (2011). Peacebuilding Mechanisms in Akwa Ibom State Oil-Bearing Communities in Nigeria. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, 1(2), 104–119.

Uyi, G. (2012). Community Perception and Oil Companies Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative in the Niger Delta. *Studies in Sociology of Science*, 3(4), 11–21. doi:10.3968/j.sss.1923018420120304.600

UNDP Nigeria. (n.d.). *Guide to the Nigerian Media* (p. 5). Retrieved from <http://web.undp.org/comtoolkit/reaching-the-outside-world/docs/BestPractices/AGuidetotheNigerianMedia.pdf>

Vaughn, J. (2007a). *Contemporary World Issues: Conflicts Over Natural Resources: A Reference Handbook*. ABC-CLIO.Inc. Retrieved from http://literati.credoreference.com/content/entry/abccnr/oil_and_natural_gas_development/0

- Vidal, J. (2013, September 13). Niger Delta Oil Spill Victims Reject “Derisory” Shell Compensation Offer. *The Guardian*. Port Harcourt. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/13/niger-delta-oil-shell-compensation>
- Watts, M. (2003). Economies of Violence: More Oil, More Blood. *Economic & Political Weekly*, 38(48), 5089 – 5099.
- Watts, M. J. (1999). *Petro-Violence: Some Thoughts on Community, Extraction, and Political Ecology*. Berkeley.
- Watts, M. J. (2005). Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social Responsibility. *Annual Review of Environment and Resources*, 30(1), 373–407. doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.30.050504.144456
- Woodward, S. L. (2007). Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1(2), 143–170. doi:10.1080/17502970701302789